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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a term calculus B which adds to the affine
λ-calculus with pairing a new construct allowing for a restricted form
of contraction. We obtain a Curry-Howard correspondence between B
and the sub-structural logical system which we call “minimal  Lukasiewicz
logic”, also known in the literature as the logic of hoops (a generalisation
of MV-algebras). This logic lies strictly in between affine minimal logic
and standard minimal logic. We prove that B is strongly normalising
and has the Church-Rosser property. We also give examples of terms
in B corresponding to some important derivations from our work and the
literature. Finally, we discuss the relation between normalisation in B and
cut-elimination for a Gentzen-style formulation of minimal  Lukasiewicz
logic.
1 Introduction
We are interested in the proof theory of  Lukasiewicz logic and subsystems
thereof. In this context, designing proof systems with nice dynamical prop-
erties – cut-elimination or normalisation – has proved to be a hard problem.
Systems with the cut-elimination property have been successfully obtained via
an extension of Gentzen’s sequent calculus by means of hypersequents [13]. But
this approach depends on the pre-linearity axiom
(A⇒ B) ∨ (B ⇒ A)
a principle that is not intuitionistically acceptable. As far as we are aware, in the
quite extensive literature on fragments of  Lukasiewicz logic that are compatible
with intuitionistic or minimal logic, such as the logic of GBL algebras [11] and
the logic of hoops [5, 7], no normalising or cut-free proof systems are to be
found.
Benton et al. [4] gave a term calculus for intuitionistic linear logic. In this
paper, we follow their approach and extend the simply-typed affine λ-calculus
with a construct that captures propositional minimal  Lukasiewicz logic. We
prove this extended system B preserves types, is strongly normalising and has
the Church-Rosser property. We give examples of terms in B corresponding to
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some important derivations from our work and from the literature on hoops and
GBL algebras.
1.1 Fragments of  Lukasiewciz logic
The standard Hilbert-style axiomatisation of (classical)  Lukasiewciz logic  LLc
may be found in [9]. It has modus ponens as its only inference rule and its
axioms comprise the axioms of basic logic:
(B1) (A⇒ B)⇒ (B ⇒ C)⇒ A⇒ C
(B2) A⊗B ⇒ A
(B3) A⊗B ⇒ B ⊗A
(B4) A⊗ (A⇒ B)⇒ B ⊗ (B ⇒ A)
(B5a) (A⊗B ⇒ C)⇒ A⇒ B ⇒ C
(B5b) (A⇒ B ⇒ C)⇒ A⊗B ⇒ C
(B6) ((A⇒ B)⇒ C)⇒ ((B ⇒ A)⇒ C)⇒ C
(B7) ⊥ ⇒ A
together with the axiom of double negation elimination.
(DNE) ¬¬A⇒ A
where ¬A is defined as A ⇒ ⊥. If from these we drop the axioms that are
not valid in minimal logic [16], i.e. (B6), (B7) and (DNE), we are left with
the fragment (B1)–(B5), which we will call minimal  Lukasiewicz logic  LLm.
If we extend  LLm with the ex-falso-quodlibet axiom (B7), we obtain what we
have called intuitionistic  Lukasiewicz logic  LLi. The logics  LLm and  LLi can
be faithfully characterised algebraically using the classes of algebraic structures
originally due to Bu¨chi and Owen and known as hoops and bounded hoops,
respectively (see [1, 2, 5, 7]). Hoops are reducts of commutative GBL algebras,
whose equational theory has been shown to be PSPACE-complete [6]. As the
equational theory of GBL algebras is a conservative extension of that of hoops,
it follows that the decision problems for  LLm and  LLi are also PSPACE-
complete1. If we omit (B4) from  LLm, we obtain the minimal (⇒,⊗)-fragment
of affine logic ALm, which we will just refer to as affine logic in this paper. For
more details about the proof theory of these systems, including double negation
translations from  LLc into  LLi and  LLm, see [3].
Our goal in this paper is to devise a typed term calculus whose inhabited
types comprise the formulas provable in  LLm with ⊗ and ⇒ viewed as the
product and function type constructors.
2 The B Calculus
Let us start by introducing the term language of the B calculus. Since we
want terms to be unambiguous representations of proofs, we give a Church-style
calculus of typed terms, rather than a Curry-style type-assignment system.
1We are indebted to the late Franco Montagna who pointed this out to us back in 2014.
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2.1 Term language
Types are formed from type variables P1, P2, . . . using the binary operators ⇒
and ⊗. We use P to range over type variables and A,B,C,D will range over
arbitrary types. The terms of the B calculus are obtained inductively starting
from typed variables (xA, yB, . . .) via the following constructs:
• λ-abstraction and term application
– λxA.t is a term when t is a term
– s t is a term when s and t are terms
• constructor and destructor for pairs
– s⊗ t is a term when s and t are terms
– let t be xA ⊗ yB in r is a term when r and t are terms, xA and yB
are distinct variables
• the break constructor:
– break t as xA, yB in r is a term when r and t are terms, xA and yB
are distinct variables.
Our typing rules will imply that the variables xA and yB in breakt as xA, yB in r
denote a higher-order function and a function respectively. From now on, we
will therefore generally use letters like ϕ and f for these variables instead of
x and y. This is illustrated in the following definition of the set FV(t) of free
variables of a term t:
FV(xA) = {xA}
FV(λxA.t) = FV(t) \{xA}
FV(s t) = FV(s) ∪ FV(t)
FV(s⊗ t) = FV(s) ∪ FV(t)
FV(let s be xA ⊗ yB in t) = (FV(t) \{xA, yB}) ∪ FV(s)
FV(break s as ϕA, fB in t) = (FV(t) \{ϕA, fB}) ∪ FV(s)
2.2 Type system
The typing rules for B are given in Figure 1. In the sequents Γ ⊢ t : A used in
the rules, the context Γ is a finite function mapping (untyped) variable names
to types, t is a B term and A is a type. In the rule [BRK], we use the following
abbreviations2:
KBA ≡ (A⇒ B)⇒ B
SBA ≡ A⇒ B.
The rules with two premises are subject to the side condition that the two
contexts Γ and ∆ must be compatible, i.e. Γ,∆ must also be a finite function
2It is noteworthy that for each formula B , the mappings A 7→ KBA and A 7→ SBA can
both be equipped with a monad structure in the simply typed λ-calculus, with A 7→ KBA
being the well-known continuation monad.
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[ASM]
Γ, x : A ⊢ xA : A
Γ ⊢ t : A ∆, ϕ : KBA, f : SBA ⊢ u : C
[BRK]
Γ,∆ ⊢ break t as ϕKBA, fSBA inu : C
Γ, x : A ⊢ t : B
[⇒I]
Γ ⊢ λxA.t : A⇒ B
Γ ⊢ t : A⇒ B ∆ ⊢ u : A
[⇒E]
Γ,∆ ⊢ t u : B
Γ ⊢ s : A ∆ ⊢ t : B
[⊗I]
Γ,∆ ⊢ s⊗ t : A⊗B
Γ ⊢ t : A⊗B ∆, x : A, y : B ⊢ u : C
[⊗E]
Γ,∆ ⊢ let t be xA ⊗ yB in u : C
Figure 1: B typing rules
mapping (untyped) variable names to types. This implies that typable terms
are affine in the sense that in any subterm each free variable appears exactly
once. However, as we will see, with the new rule [BRK] we populate many types
that are uninhabited in the affine simply-typed λ-calculus with pairing.
We say a term t is typable with type A and write t : A if the rules of B allow
us to infer a sequent of the form Γ ⊢ t : A, where Γ consists of the mappings
x : B for each xB ∈ FV(t). If t : A, then A is uniquely determined by t. If one
presents B as a Curry-style type assignment system, then the Milner-Hindley
principal type algorithm [10] extends easily to B allowing us to find a most
general type assignment for a given term. From now on we will adopt the usual
conversion of omitting type superscripts that can be inferred from the context.
2.3 Correspondence between  LLm and B
In this section we show that types inhabited by closed terms in B are precisely
the provable formulas of  LLm. To see that any formula provable in the Hilbert-
style system  LLm is (when viewed as a type) inhabited by a closed term of B,
the main work is showing that the axioms of  LLm are inhabited:
Theorem 1 If a formula A is provable in  LLm then there exists a closed B
term t which is typable with type A.
Proof: The special case of [⇒E] where the contexts Γ and ∆ are empty pro-
vides us with modus ponens. Hence it is enough to show that we have closed
terms whose types are precisely the axioms (B1)–(B5). We indeed have:
(B1) λfλgλx.g(f(x)) : (A⇒ B)⇒ (B ⇒ C)⇒ A⇒ C
(B2) λv.let v be x⊗ y in x : A⊗B ⇒ A
(B3) λv.let v be x⊗ y in y ⊗x : A⊗B ⇒ B ⊗A
(B4) λv.let v be x⊗ f in (break x as ϕ, g inϕ(f)⊗ g) : A ⊗ (A ⇒ B) ⇒
B ⊗ (B ⇒ A)
(B5a) λfλxλy.f(x⊗ y) : (A⊗B ⇒ C)⇒ A⇒ B ⇒ C
(B5b) λgλa.leta be x⊗ y in g(x)(y) : (A⇒ B ⇒ C)⇒ A⊗B ⇒ C
For the converse, to see that any type inhabited by a closed term in B is
a formula that is provable in the Hilbert-style system  LLm requires a little
4
(λx.t) s
β-conv
 t[s/x]
let t⊗u be x⊗ y in s
l-conv
 s[t/x, u/y]
break t as ϕ, f in s
b-conv
 s[(λp.p t)/ϕ, (λ .t)/f ]

 ϕ 6∈ FV(s)∨ f 6∈ FV(s)
∨ FV(t) = ∅


Figure 2: Standard conversions
ingenuity: we show that the logical principle embodied in the rule [BRK] is
derivable from the axiom (B4).
Theorem 2 If Γ ⊢ t : A in B, where Γ ≡ x1 : B1, . . . , xn : Bn, then B1 ⇒ . . .⇒
Bn ⇒ A is provable in  LLm.
Proof: If we erase the terms from the typing rules [ASM], [⇒I], [⇒E], [⊗I]
and [⊗E], the resulting logical inference rules give a standard natural deduction
presentation of affine logic, which is well known to be equivalent to the Hilbert-
style system ALm. So we have only to show that the following rule, obtained
by erasing the terms from [BRK], is derivable in  LLm = ALm + (B4):
Γ ⊢ A ∆,KBA,SBA ⊢ C
Γ,∆ ⊢ C
That in turn, follows once we can show that A ⇒ KBA ⊗ SBA is derivable
in  LLm. We start by noting that ALm proves ⊢ A ⇒ (A ⇒ B) ⇒ B i.e.,
⊢ A ⇒ KBA. Hence ALm proves ⊢ A ⇒ (A ⊗ (A ⇒ KBA)). But then,
using axiom (B4) to transform A ⊗ (A ⇒ KBA), we have that  LLm proves
⊢ A⇒ (KBA⊗ (KBA⇒ A)). As ALm also proves ⊢ B ⇒ (A⇒ B)⇒ B, i.e.,
⊢ B ⇒ KBA,  LLm proves ⊢ A ⇒ KBA ⊗ SBA. I.e., in  LLm, A is logically
stronger than the conjunction of KBA and SBA, which justifies the inference
given by [BRK]
In the above proof we have weakened A ⇒ (KBA ⊗ (KBA ⇒ A)) to A ⇒
(KBA ⊗ SBA). Since A is strictly stronger than KBA ⊗ SBA in general, the
inference rule given by [BRK] is not invertible. An alternative invertible version
of the rule [BRK] is
Γ ⊢ A ∆,KBA,KBA⇒ A ⊢ C
Γ,∆ ⊢ C
However, the simpler rule is adequate for present purposes.
2.4 Conversion Rules
We now equip our term language with type preserving conversion rules. The
conversion rules we propose are shown in Figures 2 and 3. The first two standard
conversions are the usual conversions for the affine simply-typed λ-calculus with
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(let t be x⊗ y in u) s
ap-l-conv
 let t be x⊗ y in u s
let (let t be x⊗ y in u) be v ⊗w in s
l-l-conv
 let t be x⊗ y in (letu be v ⊗w in s)
(x, y 6∈ FV(s))
(break t as ϕ, f inu) s
ap-b-conv
 break t as ϕ, f in (u s)
let (break t as ϕ, f inu) be x⊗ y in s
l-b-conv
 break t as ϕ, f in (letu be x⊗ y in s)
(ϕ, f 6∈ FV(s))
Figure 3: Permuting conversions
x : A ⊢ x : A
g : B ⇒ A ⊢ g : B ⇒ A ϕ : KBA ⊢ ϕ : KBA
[⇒E]
g : B ⇒ A,ϕ : KBA ⊢ ϕ(g) : B f : B ⇒ A ⊢ f : B ⇒ A
[⊗I]
g : B ⇒ A,ϕ : KBA, f : B ⇒ A ⊢ ϕ(g)⊗ f : B ⊗ (B ⇒ A)
[⇒I]
ϕ : KBA, f : B ⇒ A ⊢ λg.ϕ(g)⊗ f : (A⇒ B)⇒ B ⊗ (B ⇒ A)
[BRK]
x : A ⊢ break x as ϕ, f inλg.ϕ(g)⊗ f : (A⇒ B)⇒ B ⊗ (B ⇒ A)
[⇒I]
⊢ λx.break x as ϕ, f inλg.ϕ(g)⊗ f : A⇒ (A⇒ B)⇒ B ⊗ (B ⇒ A)
Figure 4: Sample derivation in B
pairing. The third standard conversion shows how to reduce terms involving
the new constructor break. The permuting conversions show how to move an
occurrence of break or let up one level in the term structure. We write t t′
when t′ can be obtained from t by applying one of the conversion of Figures 2
and 3 to a single sub-term of t. We write  ∗ for the reflexive-transitive closure
of  .
3 Example Derivations
Before investigating the theory of the conversions introduced above, we will first
look at some examples of type derivations and some examples of term normal-
isation using the conversions. For the examples we will use some important
 LLm provable formulas from our work and the literature.
3.1 The divisibility axiom
Consider an example of a type whose corresponding formula is not provable in
affine logic, but which is provable in  LLm, namely
A⇒ (A⇒ B)⇒ (B ⊗ (B ⇒ A))
This is essentially axiom (B4), and is normally referred to as the divisibility
axiom. It is well-known that the divisibility axiom characterises  Lukasiewicz
logic over affine logic [1].
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We can build a term (which can be seen as a proof) having the above type in
the calculus B is as follows: Given x : A we can break it into ϕ : A⇒ B)⇒ B
and f : B ⇒ A. Using these and g : A ⇒ B we can build a term of type
B ⊗ (B ⇒ A) as ϕ(g)⊗ f . The full type derivation for the inhabitant
t ≡ λx.break x as ϕ, f inλg.ϕ(g)⊗ f
of A⇒ (A⇒ B)⇒ B ⊗ (B ⇒ A) is shown in Figure 4.
Clearly t is in normal form, i.e., no conversion rules apply to it. However,
using t we can construct the term,
u ≡ λx′λg′.let t(x′)(g′) be m⊗ n in m
of type A⇒ (A⇒ B)⇒ B, a type that is already inhabitited in minimal affine
logic. Hence, it is reasonable to ask whether the conversions in B will reduce
this term to a term without the break constructor. This is indeed the case:
First we have:
u
β-conv
 λx′λg′.let (break x′ as ϕ, f inϕ(g′)⊗ f) be m⊗ n in m
l-b-conv
 λx′λg′.break x′ as ϕ, f in (letϕ(g′)⊗ f be m⊗ n in m)
l-conv
 λx′λg′.break x′ as ϕ, f inϕ(g′) ≡ v, say.
Now, in the term v, the variable f no longer appears free in the body of the
break term, so the side-conditions of (b-conv) hold and we may continue as
follow to get the normal form for u, which does not involve break.
v
b-conv
 λx′λg′.(λp.p(x′))(g′)
β-conv
 λx′λg′.g′(x′).
In this case we were able to reduce a term with a minimal affine type into
a term without break sub-terms, but this is not possible in general. The new
break constructor will give rise to new proofs of affine minimal logic theorems.
For instance, we have the following normal form proof of identity A⇒ A:
λxA.break xA as ϕKAA, fSAA inϕ(f).
Nevertheless, when this is applied to a closed term s of type A, we are able to
reduce (λx.break x as ϕ, f inϕ(f))(s) to s:
break s as ϕ, f inϕ(f)
b-conv
 (λp.p(s))(λ .s)
β-conv
 (λ .s)(s)
β-conv
 s
so that the new term also behaves like the identity function.
3.2 Axiom L
Consider another formula which is provable in basic logic (without using pre-
linearity) but is not provable in affine logic, namely the axiom L of [5]:
((B ⇒ A)⇒ (A⇒ B))⇒ (A⇒ B)
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Assuming ∆(B⇒A)⇒(A⇒B) and xA, we can break x as ϕKBA and fB⇒A and
construct a term of type B as ϕ(∆(f)). Discharging the two assumptions, in
our system we obtain:
⊢ λ∆λx.break x as ϕ, f inϕ(∆(f)) : ((B ⇒ A)⇒ (A⇒ B))⇒ (A⇒ B)
If we take A ≡ B, and ∆(g) = g, the term above reduces to
⊢ λx.break x as ϕ, f inϕ(f) : A⇒ A
which, as we have seen in the previous sub-section, is in normal form and behaves
as the identity function on each closed term tA.
3.3 A homomorphism property
Ferreirim [8] proved an algebraic result (in the algebra of hoops) suggesting that
the following formula should be provable in  LLm:
(A⇒ A⊗A)⇒ (A⇒ B ⊗ C)⇒ ((A⇒ B)⊗ (A⇒ C))
Her proof used model-theoretic methods and proved validity of the formula for
a restricted class of algebras. This constitutes the main lemma in the proof that
the mapping X 7→ A⇒ X is a hoop homomorphism for idempotent elements
A. With the assistance of the Otter system [12] and Veroff’s method of proof
sketches [18], Veroff and Spinks [17] found a syntactic proof of the theorem in
full generality. An indirect proof of the general result using algebraic methods
is given in [2]. Here we present a term of B with the above type.
Assuming α : A ⇒ A ⊗ A and h : A ⇒ B ⊗ C we build a term of type
(A⇒ B)⊗ (A⇒ C). This term will be built using
ϕ : KA⇒B(A⇒ B ⊗ C) f : SA⇒B(A⇒ B ⊗ C)
which we will obtain by breaking h : A⇒ B ⊗ C.
We will define a series of terms t1[ϕ], t2[x, f ], . . . , t9[h, α] where we have listed
the free-variables of each term in the brackets. The final term t9[h, α] will satisfy
t9[h, α] : (A⇒ B)⊗ (A⇒ C)
so that the term λαλh.t9[h, α] will witness the provability of our homomorphism
property.
Let pi0 : B ⊗ C → B and pi1 : (A ⇒ B)⊗ (A ⇒ C) ⇒ A ⇒ C be two closed
terms of the indicated types (such terms are easy to define in B). Now, we begin
the definition of the ti’s:
• t1[ϕ] ≡ ϕ(λmA⇒B⊗CλxA.pi0(mx))
• t2[xA, f ] ≡ λjA⇒B.let fjx be x′ ⊗ y′ in (λ .x′)⊗ (λ .y′)
so that
• t1[ϕ] : A⇒ B
• t2[xA, f ] : (A⇒ B)⇒ ((A⇒ B)⊗ (A⇒ C))
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Let Y ≡ (A⇒ B)⇒ ((A⇒ B)⊗ (A⇒ C)). Using t2[x, f ] we build
t3[x
A, f, pY⇒(A⇒C)] ≡ p(t2[x, f ])
so t3[x
A, f, pY⇒(A⇒C)] : A⇒ C. Then, using α : A⇒ A⊗A, we can get a term
of type KA⇒CY as
t4[α, f ] ≡ λp
Y⇒(A⇒C)λyA.letαy be y0 ⊗ y1 in t3[y0, f, p](y1)
So, in summary, we have built two terms
• t1[ϕ] : A⇒ B
• t4[α, f ] : (Y ⇒ (A⇒ C))⇒ A⇒ C
Now we use t1[ϕ] to build the term
t5[ϕ] ≡ λq
Y .q(t1[ϕ]) : Y ⇒ (A⇒ B)⊗ (A⇒ C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Z
We then break t5[ϕ] : Z into
ψ : KY⇒(A⇒C)Z g : SY⇒(A⇒C)Z
Defining t6 : Z ⇒ (Y ⇒ (A⇒ C)) as the closed term
t6 ≡ λu
ZλvY .pi1(u v)
we have that ψ(t6) : Y ⇒ (A⇒ C). Finally, using g : (Y ⇒ (A⇒ C))⇒ Z and
t7 ≡ λv
A⇒CλuA⇒B.u⊗ v : (A⇒ C)⇒ Y
we build
t8[g] ≡ λi
A⇒C .breakY i as η, k in g(k)(η(t7))
of type (A ⇒ C) ⇒ ((A ⇒ B) ⊗ (A ⇒ C)). The final term t9[h, α] : (A ⇒
B)⊗ (A⇒ C) can then be built as
t9[h, α] ≡ break h as ϕ, f in (break t5[ϕ] as ψ, g in t8[g](t4[α, f ](ψ(t6))))
4 Properties of the Calculus
In this section we prove three important properties of the calculus B: the subject
reduction property (conversions preserve types), strong normalisation and the
Church-Rosser property.
4.1 Subject reduction
We now demonstrate that the B conversions proposed in Figures 2 and 3 all
preserve types.
Theorem 3 If t : A and t t′ then t′ : A.
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Proof: It is sufficient to consider each of the conversions applied to the top
level of the term t. This is clearly the case for the standard β-conv and l-conv.
Assume we have a type derivation for break t as ϕ, f in s. Consider first the
case when t is closed, namely
·
·
·
pi1
⊢ t : A
ϕ : KBA ⊢ ϕ : KBA f : SBA ⊢ f : SBA
·
·
·
pi2
∆, ϕ : KBA, f : SBA ⊢ s : C
[BRK]
∆ ⊢ break t as ϕ, f in s : C
with the two sub-derivations pi1 and pi2. The conversion b-conv in this case
corresponds to the following proof transformation
·
·
· pi1
⊢ t : A
⊢ λp.p(t) : KBA
·
·
· pi1
⊢ t : A
⊢ λ .t : SBA
·
·
·
pi2
∆ ⊢ s[λp.p(t)/ϕ, λ .t/f ] : C
If t is not closed, but either ϕ or f is not free in s, the argument is similar
but an extra context Γ might be present in the derivation Γ ⊢ t : A but since
this derivation only needs to be used once this does not invalidate the proof
transformation.
Each of the permuting conversions needs to be checked as well, but this is
an easy exercise, e.g. for ap-b-conv we are transforming the derivation
·
·
·
pi1
Γ ⊢ t : A
·
·
·
pi2
∆, ϕ : KBA, f : SBA ⊢ u : C ⇒ D
Γ,∆ ⊢ break t as ϕ, f inu : C ⇒ D
·
·
·
pi3
Θ ⊢ s : C
Γ,∆,Θ ⊢ (break t as ϕ, f inu)(s) : D
into
·
·
· pi1
Γ ⊢ t : A
·
·
· pi3
Θ ⊢ s : C
·
·
· pi2
∆, ϕ : KBA, f : SBA ⊢ u : C ⇒ D
Θ,∆, ϕ : KBA, f : SBA ⊢ u s : D
Γ,Θ,∆ ⊢ break t as ϕ, f inu s : D
by moving [⇒E] above the application of [BRK]
4.2 Strong normalisation
Let us now prove that the system B is strongly normalising.
Definition 1 Let us call a l-conv or b-conv conversion in which the variables
being substituted do not actually appear free in the term s a silent conversion.
We first prove that the set of permuting conversions together with the silent
l-conv and b-conv conversions is strongly normalising:
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Lemma 4 There is no infinite sequence of terms (ti)i∈N such that each ti+1
is obtained from ti by means of a permuting conversion or a silent l-conv or
b-conv conversion.
Proof: The silent conversions make the resulting term strictly smaller than the
original one. In a let or a break term
let t be x⊗ y in s break t as ϕ, f in s
let us call t the first argument, and s the second argument. The permuting
conversions ap-l-conv and ap-b-conv reduce the type complexity of the second
argument, e.g. in
(let t be x⊗ y in s)u
the term s will have some type A⇒ B, but after the ap-l-conv conversion we
have
let t be x⊗ y in s u
where the second argument s u has type B. Finally, the permuting conversions
l-l-conv and l-b-conv reduce the size of the first argument for the let or break
expressions. If we take the product of these three measures with a lexicograph-
ical ordering we obtain a measure which decreases (on a well-founded ordering)
after each of these conversions.
Our proof of strong normalisation will make use of the following translation
of B terms into terms in the simply typed λ-calculus with pairing, which we will
denote by Λ⊗.
Definition 2 Define a translation of B terms into Λ⊗ terms inductively as:
(x)∗ = x
(λx.t)∗ = λx.t∗
(s t)∗ = s∗ t∗
(let s be x⊗ y in u)∗ = u∗[pi0(s
∗)/x][pi1(s
∗)/y]
(s⊗ t)∗ = s∗ ⊗ t∗
(break s as ϕ, f inu)∗ = u∗[k0(s
∗)/ϕ][k1(s
∗)/f ]
where pi0, pi1 are the Λ
⊗ projections, and k0 = λxλp.px and k1 = λxλ .x.
First, it is easy to prove by structural induction on the term s that the
translation s 7→ s∗ commutes with substitution:
Lemma 5 (s[t/x])∗ = s∗[t∗/x]
Using the lemma above we can state precisely how the translation of B terms
maps to a translation of conversions:
Lemma 6 We have that:
(i) If t t′ via a non-silent standard conversion in B then t∗  ∗ (t′)∗ in one
or more standard conversions in Λ⊗.
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(ii) If t t′ via a silent standard conversion or a permuting conversion in B
then t∗ = (t′)∗.
Theorem 7 B is strongly normalising.
Proof: Suppose that there was an infinite sequence (ti)i∈N of B terms such
that for each i we have that ti+1 is obtained from ti by one of the B conversions
(standard or permuting). By Lemma 6 we would then obtain a sequence of
Λ⊗-terms (t∗i )i∈N where for each i, either
• t∗i+1 is obtained from t
∗
i via one or more Λ
⊗ conversions, or
• t∗i+1 = t
∗
i
Since Λ⊗ is strongly normalising, we know that from some number N and all
i ≥ N we must have that t∗i = t
∗
i+1. But this would mean that in the original
sequence, we have an infinite chain of permuting conversions or silent standard
conversions, contradicting Lemma 4.
4.3 Church-Rosser property
Theorem 8 B has the Church-Rosser property.
Proof: Since we have strong normalisation for B, by Newman’s lemma, it is
enough to prove the weak Church-Rosser property, i.e., that if w  w′ and
w  w′′ then there is a w′′′ such that w′′  ∗ w′′′ and w′′  ∗ w′′′. The proof is
by induction on the structure of w and is fairly standard, so we will only sketch
it here. See [14, Theorem 6.3.9] for an example of this kind of proof. One checks
that for all substitutions σ and all terms s and s′
• if s s′ then s[σ] s′[σ], and
• for all total functions f ⊆ ∗ we have s[σ] ∗ s[σ′], where σ′ = f ◦ σ.
These facts deal with the only tricky case in the proof for the simply-typed λ-
calculus, when w is the β-redex (λx.s)u, w′ = s[u/x] and w′′ is either (λx.s′)u
or (λx.s)u′. The proof now reduces to an analysis of the critical pairs: i.e.,
the reducts w′ and w′′ of a term w in which two redexes overlap in such a
way that carrying out either conversion affects the structure required by the
other conversion. Inspection of the conversions shows that the are no critical
pairs involving β-conv, but critical pairs do arise for the following pairs of
conversions.
l-conv v. ap-l-conv
l-conv v. l-l-conv
b-conv v. ap-b-conv
b-conv v. l-b-conv
ap-l-conv v. l-l-conv
ap-l-conv v. l-b-conv
l-l-conv v. l-l-conv
In the first four types of critical pair, the conversion to w′ (say) eliminates both
the redexes while w′′ still has a redex of the same type as was used to reduce
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w to w′. E.g., consider the critical pair of the form l-conv v. ap-l-conv. If we
set:
w = (let t⊗u be x⊗ y in s)r
w′ = (s[t/x, u/y])r
w′′ = let t⊗u be x⊗ y in (s r)
then w
l-conv
 w′ and w
ap-l-conv
 w′′. So taking w′′′ = w′, we have that w′  ∗
w′′′ (trivially) and that w′′
l-conv
 w′′.
In the remaining three types of critical pair, both w′ and w′′ require further
conversion. E.g., consider ap-l-conv v. l-b-conv. If we set:
w = (let (break t as φ, f inu) be x⊗ y in s)r
w′ = let (break t as φ, f inu) be x⊗ y in (s r)
w′′ = (break t as φ, f in (letu be x⊗ y in s))r
then w
ap-l-conv
 w′ and w
l-b-conv
 w′′. But then putting
w′′′ = break t as φ, f in (letu be x⊗ y in (s r))
we have:
w′
l-b-conv
 break t as φ, f in (letu be x⊗ y in (s, r)) = w′′′
and
w′′
ap-b-conv
 break t as φ, f in ((letu be x⊗ y in s)r)
ap-l-conv
 break t as φ, f in (letu be x⊗ y in (s, r)) = w′′′
The treatment of the other types of critical pair is similar.
Although the Church-Rosser property is not difficult to prove, it was quite
tricky to find a suitable system of conversions. One of our earlier attempts
included the following conversion
break(let t be x⊗ y in u) as ϕ, f in s
b-l-conv
 let t be x⊗ y in (breaku as ϕ, f in s)
If we put:
w = break let t be x⊗ y in u as φ, f in s
then we find (assuming FV(t) = FV(u) = ∅) that:
w
b-conv
 s[λp.p(let t be x⊗ y in u)/φ, λ .let t be x⊗ y in u/f ]
and
w
b-l-conv
 let t be x⊗ y in (break u as φ, f in s)
b-conv
 let t be x⊗ y in s[λp.p u/φ, λ .u/f ]
So w would have two distinct normal forms if we admitted b-l-conv.
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[ASM]
Γ, A ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ A ∆, A ⊢ C
[CUT]
Γ,∆ ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ A ∆,KBA,SBA ⊢ C
[BRK]
Γ,∆ ⊢ C
Γ, A ⊢ B
[⇒R]
Γ ⊢ A⇒ B
Γ ⊢ A ∆, B ⊢ C
[⇒L]
Γ,∆, A⇒ B ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ A ∆ ⊢ B
[⊗R]
Γ,∆ ⊢ A⊗B
Γ, A,B ⊢ u : C
[⊗L]
Γ, A⊗B ⊢ C
Figure 5: Sequent calculus for  LLm
5 A Gentzen-style Calculus and Cut Elimina-
tion
We have so far discussed the dynamics of  LLm natural deduction proofs via
normalisation, using our Curry-Howard correspondence. We can also look at
these results using a Gentzen-style calculus with left and right rules, and look
into cut elimination. Such a system for  LLm is given in Figure 5.
Theorem 9 The provable sequents of the Gentzen system of Figure 5 are the
same as those of  LLm.
Proof: The break rule of Figure 5 matches precisely the break rule of our
natural deduction system B, which we have already shown to coincide with
 LLm. It is standard to show that the left and right rules are inter-derivable
with the introduction and elmination rules of the natural deduction system.
Theorem 10 The cut rule [CUT] is eliminable from the proof system of Figure
5.
Proof: For each left and right rule, let us call the formula which is being
introduced the major formula. When the application of cut involves two major
formulas, then such cut can be replaced by cuts of smaller complexity, as in the
standard cut elimination procedure. In all other cases, when the cut formula A
is not major, the cut can be pushed up the proof tree. This can also be done
with the new break rule [BRK]. When one of the premises of the cut rule is an
axiom the cut rule can be eliminated.
The reader might have noticed, however, that [BRK] has a very similar
flavour to [CUT]. But it follows directly from the theorem above that the rule
[BRK] is not derivable from [CUT], since [CUT] is eliminable but [BRK] is not.
There are, however, some particular instance of [BRK] which are indeed deriv-
able from [CUT].
Theorem 11 When Γ = ∅ then [BRK] is derivable from [CUT].
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Proof: We can derive [BRK] as follows:
⊢ A
=======
⊢ B ⇒ A
⊢ A
======
⊢ KBA ∆,KBA,SBA ⊢ C
[CUT]
∆, B ⇒ A ⊢ C
[CUT]
∆ ⊢ C
where the double lines indicate one or more steps.
Theorem 12 When KBA or SBA is a superfluous assumption in proving ∆,KBA,SBA ⊢
C then [BRK] is derivable from [CUT].
Proof: Consider the case when KBA is not needed, so that we actually have
∆, SBA ⊢ C. Such instance of [BRK] can be derived from [CUT] as:
⊢ A
=======
⊢ B ⇒ A ∆, B ⇒ A ⊢ C
[CUT]
∆ ⊢ C
The case where SBA is superfluous can be treated in the same way.
These last two theorems justify our side conditions for the conversion rule
(b-conv) from Section 2.4. The context Γ being empty corresponds to the
term t being closed (FV(t) = ∅), whereas KBA or B ⇒ A begin superfluous
assumptions correspond to ϕ 6∈ FV(s) or f 6∈ FV(s). From a Gentzen-style
point of view, these are the cases where we can always replace a break rule by
a standard cut rule.
6 Concluding Remarks
Strong normalisation for the standard simply-typed λ-calculus with pairing is
well-known. Strong normalisation for the affine fragment of that calculus follows
or can be proved more directly when one observes that the conversions always
reduce the size of an affine term. Troelstra [15] proved strong normalisation
for a variant of the term calculus for intuitionistic linear logic proposed by
Benton et al. [4]. In that calculus it is the exponential operator ! that makes
the normalisation result tricky, since the usual introduction rule for ! also acts
as an elimination rule. Similarly, in B, the rule for break complicates the
normalisation proof. In both cases, the desire to control contraction is the
source of the difficulty.
The decision problem for classical  Lukasiewicz logic is known to be co-NP-
complete while the decision problem for minimal  Lukasiewicz logic can be shown
to reduce to the decision problem for the equational theory of commutative
GBL-algebras, which is known to be PSPACE-complete [6]. In both cases, the
known decision procedures are based on semantic methods and no effective proof
search methods are known. The present work is motivated by a desire either to
find such algorithms or to understand why they cannot exist. It seems highly
unlikely that a logic with a PSPACE-complete decision problem could admit an
analytic inference system. However from the strong normalisation property, one
can hope to derive effective bounds on the size of a deduction and the formulas
in it and so, perhaps, find some weak form of the sub-formula property that
could enable a proof-theoretic decision procedure.
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